装备采办中的讨价还价博弈模型

竞争性谈判是一种重要的武器装备采办方式，军方与承包商之间的谈判是一个重复博弈过程，双方谈判的本质是讨价还价。分析了轮流出价的讨价还价模型，对轮流出价博弈的子博弈精炼均衡进行了论述；在轮流出价模型的基础上建立了同时出价的讨价还价模型，并对2种模型的特点进行了分析；通过案例对2个模型的均衡结果进行了对比。分析结果显示：同时出价的讨价还价模型更能有效解决实际问题，更具有现实意义。     

基于Epsilon-Nash策略的动态武器-目标分配方法

在大型任务规划软件的作战单元任务分配中,搜索零和博弈问题的纳什均衡点是求解任务分配的一种有效的方法。然而,纳什均衡点在决策中并不一定总是存在且唯一,这造成了纳什均衡策略在实际使用时具有较大的局限。通过采用Epsilon-Nash策略克服这种局限,并将其应用于自主空战任务规划系统中,通过仿真实验,证实Epsilon-Nash策略具有近似于纳什策略的效果。     

Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.     

一类微分多项式的值分布

讨论了微分多项式fnP(f)(n≥2)之导数的Picard例外集问题,在Picard例外集的意义之下推广了Anderson等人的结果。     

An integrated electric power supply chain and fuel market network framework: Theoretical modeling with empirical analysis for New England

In this article, we develop a novel electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures both the economic network transactions in energy supply markets and the physical network transmission constraints in the electric power network. The theoretical derivation and analysis are done using the theory of variational inequalities. We then apply the model to a specific case, the New England electric power supply chain, consisting of six states, five fuel types, 82 power generators, with a total of 573 generating units, and 10 demand market regions. The empirical case study demonstrates that the regional electric power prices simulated by our model match the actual electricity prices in New England very well. We also compute the electric power prices and the spark spread, an important measure of the power plant profitability, under natural gas and oil price variations. The empirical examples illustrate that in New England, the market/grid‐level fuel competition has become the major factor that affects the influence of the oil price on the natural gas price. Finally, we utilize the model to quantitatively investigate how changes in the demand for electricity influence the electric power and the fuel markets from a regional perspective. The theoretical model can be applied to other regions and multiple electricity markets under deregulation to quantify the interactions in electric power/energy supply chains and their effects on flows and prices. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

基于博弈论的装备采办成本控制问题研究

从武器装备采办的理论需求出发,以博弈论为理论工具,对武器装备采办过程中的生产成本控制问题进行了分析;建立了基于激励的生产成本控制模型,并对成本控制模型的特点进行了分析和解释;针对军方在激励合同执行过程中有可能出现的2类错误,对成本控制模型进行了优化。在非对称信息条件下,优化后的成本控制模型不但能有效减少2类错误的发生,而且可提高军方装备采办效用,减少代理方合同风险。     

基于Multi-Agent的航空集群系统重构机理研究

集群作战是未来空中作战的主要样式,其重构机理的研究对于提升航空集群执行任务的整体性能以及在遭受攻击时的生存能力具有重要作用。从作战任务层面出发,对集群系统重构的定义以及类型、触发机制和基本原则进行了分析阐述;借鉴博弈论理论,将航空集群系统分布式重构问题映射为多Agent之间的合作-竞争问题,建立了基于Multi-Agent的系统重构模型,给出了重构的流程与算法,为航空集群系统自适应重构能力的设计实现提供了理论技术支持。     

基于博弈论的装备采购定价激励模型

不同的定价方式和定价参数的选择对于承包商会起到不同程度的激励作用。为提高装备采购效益,在承包商追求效用最大化假设的基础上,建立了装备采购完全信息动态博弈模型。对价格、成本、承包商努力程度和承包商效用之间的关系进行了研究,证明了成本分担和固定价格的定价方式能够有效激励承包商提高自身努力水平降低成本,并提出了2种定价方式的参数定量计算方法。     

不完全信息下军事威逼讨价还价博弈分析

在详细分析威慑与威逼区别的基础上,构建了不完全信息下军事威逼讨价还价博弈模型。按照最大期望效用准则,分析了不完全信息下军事威逼走向讨价还价阶段的条件,研究表明:运用鲁宾斯坦经典讨价还价唯一完美均衡解,得出以下结论:争夺目标自身的效用越大,战争带来的声誉得益效用越大,军事威逼走向讨价还价阶段的可能性越大;一旦进入讨价还价阶段,威逼者会接受挑战者提出的方案,冲突将不再发生。     

阻化烟煤堆非稳态温度场计算

依据实验测得的干、水湿和阻化烟煤氧化反应的动力学参数 ,引入了氧传质模型和水蒸气平衡模型 ,利用计算机编程对干、水湿和阻化烟煤堆内的一维非稳态自热过程的模型分别进行差分计算 ,求得相应煤堆内的非稳态温度场。结果表明 ,采用简化的一维自热过程的非稳态数学模型计算 ,可以剖析氧传递、水蒸气平衡和阻化处理对煤堆自热的影响 ,可以评价实际煤堆的自热危险性和判断烟煤堆的阻化处理效果